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1. Introduction  
“The lives of millions of people depend on our collective ability to act. In our world of plenty, there is 
no excuse for inaction or indifference. We have heard the alerts. Now there is no time to lose.” This is 
what Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres urged on the 22th of February 2017 
while pleading for the world to shift its gaze to the over 20 million starving people in South Sudan, 
Somalia, Yemen, and north-east Nigeria. The Secretary could very well have continued: “It is not 
beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to 
very small proportions. The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering.” 
Suiting as it is, this second quote I borrowed from Peter Singer’s 1972 influential and inspirational essay 
Famine, affluence, and morality.   
  It is apparent that even though global society has become ever more connected over the past 
fifty years, most of its people still display a rather negligent attitude to those living under dire 
circumstances. When writing his article, Singer too had no illusions that such attitudes would change 
any time soon. He defended his argument against the common view that, since I am just one of many 
people able to alleviate global poverty, I can only be hold responsible to a very negligent extent. Even 
more, if others are also failing to undertake any action, why would I have to feel guilty about my own 
failure to do so? It would have been different if my actions are the sole determinant of whether others 
live in poverty – but clearly they are not. Singer argues, though, “that there is a psychological difference 
between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, 
who have also done nothing. Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations.” He 
continues: 
  I very much admire the position Singer is taking here and – undoubtedly together with many 
others – cannot say that I do not feel inspired by his essay. Yet, I also think that there is a disguised 
flaw in his argument, a flaw which makes that I disagree with Singer’s overdemanding conclusion that 
“if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 836). In reaching this conclusion, 
I think Singer fails to adequately distinguish between what human behavior is, and what human 
behavior ought to be like. Although, Singer does point out that there is an important difference 
between what humans are psychologically likely to do and what our moral obligations are, by making 
“Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull [a] drowning child out of the pond if on looking 
around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing 
nothing? One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen 
obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils – 
poverty, overpopulation, pollution – are problems in which everyone is almost equally evolved 
(Singer 1972, 838, emphasis added).  
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this distinction he fails to take into account that what people ought to do is necessarily derived from 
what they are both physically and psychologically able to do. Even more, by arguing for such stringent 
individual moral obligations, I think Singer is contributing to the problem that he is trying to solve. By 
confronting individuals with overly demanding obligations, I think he is only assisting the individual 
psychological tendency to find excuses for inactivity.    
  In this thesis my aim is to argue for a different conception of moral remedial responsibility for 
alleviating the world’s plights. One that I think is sufficiently consistent with human nature, while also 
being satisfactorily idealistic in requiring changes in our current behavior that – potentially – have  far-
reaching consequences. In contrast to Singer, I will argue that psychological differences do affect our 
moral obligations. My main concern here is to discuss the relation between what is known as coping 
behavior and individual remedial responsibility. I hope that by discussing the nature of coping behavior, 
and how it affects individual motivational ability for action, I can show that it is important for theories 
of moral responsibility to take this essential feature of human nature into account when arguing for 
certain moral principles. Any moral principle that fails to be consistent with how humans actually tend 
to behave, I think is likely to be too idealistic, and cannot provide an adequate account of what we 
ought to do. Yet, as I will hope to show, this does not mean that all normativity is lost – on the contrary, 
I think that by focusing on what more realistically lies within human capacity, moral demands can 
eventually lead to great changes in that behavior. What is at stake here is not the defense of a general 
moral demand that perfectly describes all individual obligations with regards to remedial responsibility, 
but rather an attempt to provide principles that help us make sense of what we are morally required 
to do. By focusing on improving the moral system that functions as a guidepost for our moral principles, 
I think that morally valuable changes in human behavior will naturally arise.    
 The structure of this thesis is as follows. In chapter two I will argue for a conception of moral 
responsibility that is based on the twin pillars of awareness and capacity. In section 2.1 I will provide 
three conditions which I think can function as a guiding mechanism for a system of moral responsibility 
and finding the corresponding degree of individual moral accountability. The underlying assumption is 
that, only if we are able to change the course of our actions, can we be held morally accountable for 
doing so. In section 2.2 I will provide a positive account of why I think these three conditions are 
important in guiding our moral principles. I am mostly interested in the relation between our 
motivational ability to undertake certain actions, how they are affected by coping mechanisms, and 
the relation to moral obligations. Coping mechanisms are (often subconscious) mental processes that 
obscure the full significance of moral demands within the standpoint of our practical reason. The 
implication of such mechanisms is that it becomes harder for individuals to be motivated to undertake 
a certain action. My main argument here is that, upon becoming aware of moral demands, to the 
extent that our motivational ability to act upon such moral demands is hindered by coping mechanisms, 
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we face less stringent moral obligations as compared to when my motivational ability would not have 
been hindered by coping mechanisms. In section 2.3 I will provide an example that I think helps in 
clarifying this claim.   
  In section 2.4 I characterize the account I proposed in the previous sections as a theory of 
moral reason. My main aim in this section is to argue that moral responsibility only arises if individuals 
themselves are aware of certain moral demands. That is to say that I think that there are no moral 
demands existing outside of individual recognition which can render individuals morally responsible. 
This is not a claim about whether there is in fact an objective moral good or not – because no matter 
if there is or is not, such a demand can only affect individual accountability if individuals themselves 
are aware of it. In section 2.5 then, I will continue by considering the relation between individual 
awareness of moral demands and moral accountability. I will argue that, even if we assume that within 
theories of moral reason all individuals are equally capable of perceiving moral demands, this does not 
imply that we are all equally capable of acting upon those demands. There is an important difference 
between individual capacity to recognize a moral demand, and their actual ability to act upon this 
demand. Capacity considers the potential for action, whereas ability is the actual physical and cognitive 
capability of performing an action in the present. Based on differences in motivational abilities to act 
upon the awareness of moral demands in this section I side with Neo-Humeans in arguing that the 
moral authority of moral demands can be different for different individuals at different points in time 
– even if we accept the Kantian presupposition that all free and rational agents have an equal capacity 
for recognizing moral justifications. Correspondingly, I also think that differences in perceived moral 
authority come with differences in moral obligations. While individual capacity to recognize moral 
demands may be seen as equal, the capacity to act upon them is not.     
  In chapter three, I will continue to present the conception of moral responsibility elaborated 
on in section two, and link it to remedial responsibility specifically. In section 3.1 and 3.2 I will argue 
that current philosophical accounts focus too much on principles of justice when considering remedial 
responsibility. Although principles of justice do have an important role to play in allocating obligations 
for moral responsibility, I think they are insufficient for adequately making sense of our responsibility 
to provide aid to the faraway and needy. A moral account based on awareness and capacity is, I argue, 
able to fill this gap in our responsibilities. Moral remedial responsibility is not concerned with allocating 
responsibilities to individuals, but rather focuses on evaluating the acts and omissions by virtue of 
moral demands that individuals themselves are aware of. Based on the account developed in the 
second chapter, people with a lower motivational ability to take these moral demands into account in 
their actions, have a less stringent obligation to actually do so. The point is, however, that by morally 
requiring that all persons who are aware of a moral demand, need to continue considering the full 
significance of such moral demands in their deliberations, even while initially not actively acting upon 
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them, coping mechanisms can be countered. An important implication of this argument is that our 
future potential motivational ability to act upon moral demands will also increase.    
  By focusing on distributing obligations for remedial responsibility based on notions of causality, 
liability, or interdependence we cannot sufficiently require people to undertake actions that have far-
reaching effects on the living circumstances of those whose human rights are generally deprived. 
Instead, by turning our attention to the system moral accountability, I believe we can gradually change 
people their perception of the moral demand to provide aid to others outside of their usual sphere of 
interests. Underlying this idea is the recognition of a basic minimal notion of humanity that we 
recognize in practically all human beings. The full significance of this common humanity in relation to 
moral demands is I think obscured by coping mechanisms, rendering people generally unable to act 
upon stringent moral remedial obligations. However, by accepting less stringent forms of moral 
responsibility at first, starting with feelings of shame and regret, moving to the need for spreading 
awareness, and only at last towards undertaking direct action, I think the significance which moral 
demands carry within the individual standpoint of practical reason increases. The self-strengthening 
effect is that the more significant the perception of these moral demands are, the greater individual 
capacity to act upon them becomes, the more stringent individual moral obligations will be. Instead of 
starting with an idealistic demand of what is morally required of people, this approach starts with what 
is realistically possible and ends up with idealistic normative claims.   
 
2.1 An Account of Moral Responsibility: Three Conditions  
In this section I wish to set up a positive account of moral responsibility that will function as a basis for 
considering remedial responsibility. Later on in this same chapter, I will contrast my account of moral 
responsibility against other such accounts. The key claim I am making here is that we cannot 
realistically assume that all individuals have an equal ability to act upon moral demands of which they 
themselves are aware. Coping mechanisms in the process of individual motivation hinder individuals 
in recognizing the full authority of moral demands within their standpoint of practical reason. Although 
individuals may be equally capable of recognizing the justifications of moral demands, they are not 
equally capable of acting upon of such demands once they have been recognized. This is important, 
because I think this also means that different individuals cannot be held morally responsible to similar 
degrees for comparable acts and omissions, since their capacity for having acted differently is not equal. 
For some individuals it may be easier to take moral demands into account as guides for their actions, 
while for others it may be harder. These differences among individuals,  I will assume are not inherent 
psychological differences, but rather contingently dependent on the contextual influences that an 
individual has been subjected to.   
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 Before further elaborating on these claims, it is first important to expand on what I mean by 
the two concepts that I think form the basis of the conception of moral responsibility I am proposing: 
the twin pillars of awareness and capacity. In relation to moral responsibility, awareness I take to be 
the state or quality of being conscious of a moral demand. Regardless of how such awareness came to 
be, the state of becoming aware signifies the moment after which a moral demand is recognized by an 
individual’s cognitive mental processes. Here, I take awareness to be a static phenomenon, which one 
either is or is not over different points in time. You may also have a more gradual conception of 
awareness, according to which awareness is seen as constantly influenced by both affective and 
cognitive mental processes. Such a conception, I think, also suits within the account of moral 
responsibility I am developing here. What is important is not that awareness is brought about through 
cognition alone, but that there is a distinctive moment after which individuals become sufficiently 
aware of moral demands in order to be held morally accountable – regardless of whether affective 
mental processes are still influencing this tentative state of mind. This distinctive moment occurs when 
the awareness of a moral demand gives an individual a reason for action within the standpoint of her 
practical deliberation. The fact that an individual herself recognizes some authority of a moral demand, 
renders her minimally obligated to take this moral demand into account when performing her actions. 
Morally speaking, I think this moment is reached when the following two conditions are met:  
1. An individual becomes aware of a certain moral principle that functions as a constraint  
on the range of acts and omissions that she can perform/not perform morally speaking. 
2. An individual becomes aware of the morally relevant state of affairs that provide her 
with a reason to take this moral principle (as it is recognized in condition 1) into 
account.    
To meet these two conditions, it is irrelevant whether we regard the moral principles that individuals 
become aware of as principles which are in themselves objectively true. Regardless of whether they 
are or are not, only after an individual herself recognizes a moral principle does she become 
accountable for acting or not acting upon this principle. The main reason is that a person can only be 
held morally accountable if it is fair to do so. Whether the actions of agents are desirable in itself is not 
something that can make somebody morally accountable, except if she herself is aware of such a 
desirability. This claim will be further expanded on in section 2.4 when discussing theories of moral 
standards.   
  The conception of capacity I am interested in here, considers the motivational ability – the 
ability to be motivated towards a specific goal - that individuals have for fulfilling a moral demand. This 
already assumes that a (moral) goal is sufficiently significant for an individual to provide a reason for 
action, and hence that an individual is aware of a specific goal, but it does not necessarily follow that 
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she has most reason to pursue the goal from the standpoint of her practical reason. Capacity is thus 
the scope of potential actions that a person can undertake. If her motivational ability is greater, than 
her capacity also becomes greater, because the likelihood of undertaking a specific action increases 
compared to the likelihood of undertaking other actions. As I see it, when considering a person her 
motivational ability, we are focusing on her cognitive capability to perform a specific action at a certain 
point in time. Yet, when we are considering her capacity for performing that same action, we need to 
compare her cognitive ability to perform that action to all other plans for action she has in mind. In 
this sense, even if one may have ample cognitive ability to do X, if one rather performs actions Y and Z 
first, the ability to X may go hand in hand with a relatively small capacity to X.  Where ability signifies 
the actual physical and cognitive capability an individual has to perform a certain action, capacity 
signifies the potential one has for performing an action. Although in this thesis it is assumed that all 
individuals have an equal a priori cognitive capacity for recognizing moral justifications by virtue of 
their common rationality, I argue, not all individuals have an equal cognitive ability act upon those 
justifications over time. I personally prefer the more empirical claim that most people generally have 
an equal capacity for recognizing moral justifications, yet my goal here is to show that even on the 
Kantian idea that we have this capacity by virtue of being free and rational agents, it does not follow 
that we have equal moral obligations. While the ability to recognize the full authority of moral 
justifications may be obscured by coping mechanisms, the motivational ability of an individual to act 
towards a certain goal is dependent on the relation which this goal has to the other conscious and 
subconscious interests an individual has. Focusing on motivational ability, for example, if a goal carries 
more weight within the standpoint of one’s practical  reason, an individual has a greater capacity for 
acting towards achieving this goal. If it carries less weight, an individual has a lesser capacity to act 
towards this goal. When a goal is in itself morally relevant, I think that from such a greater or lesser 
capacity to act towards such a goal, it also follows that individuals can have more stringent or more 
relaxed moral obligations to perform actions towards that goal. Moral accountability is thus also 
limited by this third constraint:  
3.  It is within an individual's capacity to have acted otherwise, where the degree of  moral 
obligations positively correlates to both the degree of motivational and physical ability 
individuals have for acting morally.   
It is thus possible for me to be morally responsible to a greater extent for failing to undertake a certain 
action, if the motivation I have for undertaking this action is greater than it is for another individual, 
even if we both fail to undertake the same action. I would now first like to provide a more positive 
account for explaining why I think there are differences in moral obligations for similar acts and 
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omissions, whereas later, in sections 2.4 and 2.5, I will defend this argument against possible objections.  
  
2.2 Moral Responsibility and Coping Mechanisms  
The variety in moral obligations that individuals have for acting towards a moral goal is based upon the 
idea that in order for individuals to be morally accountable, they must simultaneously be aware of the 
moral nature of their acts and omissions, while it must also lie within their capacity to perform 
differently. Let me emphasize here that the capacity to perform differently, is a different capacity than 
the capacity to become aware of a moral demand in the first place. While awareness is quality  
assumed to be static, the capacity to perform differently is, a quality which differs among different 
individuals at different points in time. To support this claim, I heavily rely on a psychological account 
of the process of motivation provided by Menno Mennes.  
  In his De Theatro Motivarum, Mennes (2016) provides a theoretical model for the process of 
motivation. Regrettably, this theory is far too extensive to fully discuss adequately within the scope of 
this thesis. Yet, I do think that by referring to some of its components, this  theory of motivation can 
function as a helpful guide for elaborating on the claims about moral responsibility I have been making 
so far.  
  Mennes regards the process of 
motivation as consisting of multiple 
psychological phases that follow each other in 
sequential order (see Fig. 1). Going through 
these phases, an individual is constantly 
appraising the goal that she aims at achieving 
against internal and external influences. 
Through the investment of effort and the 
confrontation with interferences from an 
external reality, individuals reassess the 
position of a certain (moral) goal within their 
standpoint of practical reason. After having 
invested effort and being confronted with the 
impact of an interfering external reality, 
individuals return to the phase of 
expectancies, in which the person adjusts the 
expectations set out initially to anticipate 
better for an interfering reality.  
Fig 1. A visualized overview of the eight phases in the 
theoretical model of motivation (Mennes 2016, 28)  
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  Mennes points out “that a second motivational cycle starts with two intentions in mind: (1) to 
further enhance the influence of reality when its impact is perceived as positive to the process of 
motivation, [or] to reduce the influence of reality when its impact is perceived as negative” (2016, 35). 
This second cycle in the process of motivation thus helps individuals in dealing with an interfering 
reality when that reality makes it harder to achieve the goal that was set out in this first place. Often 
it may turn out harder to achieve an objective we initially set out to do during our first phase of 
expectancies, which leads us to adjust our expectancies in a second cycle of the process of motivation. 
Either we change the goal we initially hoped to achieve itself, or we change the amount of effort we 
are willing to invest in achieving this goal and the corresponding rewards that such an achievement 
would give us; “in the process of motivation, then, there appears to be a covering up, a hiding of true 
intentions in order to prevent failure and frustration” (Mennes 2016, 37). It may be helpful to further 
quote Mennes at large here:  
  The individual tendency to neutralize the interference from reality is referred to as coping 
behavior. Mennes has emphasized that this coping behavior often occurs subconsciously, but 
nevertheless is something which individuals can also become cognitively aware of. I assume that to the 
degree that I am consciously aware of a moral demand, it is to a certain degree within my motivational 
ability to act upon this moral demand. Even in situations where I perceive to have no other choice than 
to perform an action which by itself neglects a moral demand, it is still within my ability to perform 
this action while feeling a sense of regret or shame. I may not have the motivational ability to act 
differently, but I do have the ability to dislike the action that I am performing; “acting” in this sense is 
interpreted broadly, where besides physical actions it also signifies mental actions. Even though coping 
mechanisms may obscure the full significance of a moral demand, it may still be within an individual’s  
minimal capacity to take a moral demand into account in performing her acts and omissions. By being 
minimally able to take these demands into account, I still have an obligation to undertake those 
(mental) actions that may counter my coping behavior and in time provide me with more reason to act 
towards the moral demand. One important way through which I can do this, is by simply accepting my 
own current motivational inability to act upon a moral demand, while continuing to recognize the 
significance of that demand. This will lead me to take the – perhaps frustrating and confronting – reality 
Motivation is assumed to be an ‘inner dialogue’, a Process, largely evaluative in nature, evolving 
around an objective the individual seeks to achieve. Assessments are made regulating activities 
aimed at reaching the objective. In this process, the individual is confronted with outside 
interferences defined as ‘reality’. Surprisingly, instead of integrating these new perspectives from 
reality the individuals seems to change reality, neutralizing its input when its effects are perceived 
as negative, and emphasizing its input when effects are positive, thus preserving and securing the 
objective against these interferences. The more significant the objective initially set, the more 
these protective mechanisms apply (Mennes 2016, 38).  
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into account, and may lead to a greater ability to act upon this demand in the future. If, on the other 
hand, coping mechanisms continue to obscure the significance of moral demands, not only does it 
remain outside of my ability to act upon them, but it also further decreases my capacity, my potential 
for future action, for acting upon them.   
   Without actively trying to recognize the full significance to act towards a certain moral goal, 
coping mechanisms will continue to obscure this moral goal and my awareness of the moral nature of 
my actions. Coping is a mechanism which changes how reality is represented to an individual and how 
willing an individual is to work towards a certain goal and what she thinks will be the reward for 
achieving this goal. In this sense, coping behavior takes place right on the psychological edge of how 
individuals realistically behave and how they might ideally behave. If it is indeed true that it is human 
nature to cover up our true intentions, this seems to be exactly the mental practice which explains why 
there is still a huge discrepancy between what we often think we ought to do, and the things we 
actually do.   
  I think these claims have normative importance, because they explain why some think moral 
principles are decisively significant in guiding our actions, others perceive them to be unrealistically 
demanding – even impossible to consistently follow. What I think Mennes shows is that such a 
discrepancy may be the results of subconscious coping mechanisms. To the extent that it is, I think this 
has implications for what we can require of individuals that they ought to do. If I am perceiving a moral 
demand as something which I am practically unable to do, it is barely within my capacity to take this 
demand into account as a guide for my actions. Correspondingly, it is only fair to blame me for my acts 
and omissions to the extent that it could be reasonably expected that I would have indeed acted 
differently. I cannot be blamed to the same extent for failing to take a moral demand into account, as 
is somebody who is much more motivated to follow a similar moral demand.   
  Moral demands recognized by an individual as providing a reason for action are likely to be 
concealed by coping mechanisms because she is confronted with a reality which makes it hard for her 
to act upon these demands. The authority of moral demands, in this sense, is similar to the significance 
of objectives that Mennes discusses. The more authority a moral demand carries for an individual, the 
stronger will coping mechanisms try to conceal this objective to the individual when she is faced with 
a reality that obstructs her from complying to the moral demand. On the one hand, this means that it 
is within our capacity to act upon these moral demands. If we would not have this capacity, we would 
not regard the moral demand as a somewhat authoritative and significant goal in the first place. Yet 
on the other, if the capacity to act upon moral demands is obstructed by coping behavior, it becomes 
increasingly harder to act upon these demands, for their initial significance will be concealed and 
covered up, thereby decreasing the weight they carry within the standpoint of one’s practical reason.  
  It follows from this account that those persons who have highly effective coping mechanisms 
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have a very low capacity to act upon a moral demand, and thereby can barely be morally obligated to 
undertake specific actions towards a moral demand. Although I think this is an aspect of my argument 
which seems counter-intuitive, I do think it is one that we need to accept. I will further elaborate on 
why I think so in sections 2.4 and 2.5, but the main argument is that we cannot base more responsibility 
in what seems desirable to expect from people in them performing certain acts and omissions. Besides, 
I think that the power of less stringent moral obligations may generally be underestimated. One 
implication of the argument I am developing in this thesis is that by posing relatively relaxed moral 
obligations on people who have a lower capacity for acting towards certain moral demands, the 
likelihood that a person will undertake some action towards a moral demand increases. The underlying 
idea is that, when many individuals accept less stringent moral obligations such as feelings of regret or 
shame, such feelings will resonate through society, and thereby change the ‘external reality’ that 
obstructed the initial process of individual motivation. Consequently, I think, individual capacity to act 
towards a moral demand increases, and more stringent moral obligations can be posed. I conjecture 
that a further obligation, for example, could be the obligation to spread awareness of a moral demand, 
without oneself having to actually undertake direct action. Undertaking direct action towards fulfilling 
a moral demand is one of the most stringent obligations of moral responsibility, and it can only be 
required of individuals to undertake such actions once their ability to do so carries sufficient authority 
within their standpoint of practical reason.  
 
2.3 An Example: Eating Meat 
Before defending this account against possible objections, I would first like to further elaborate on the 
above claims with an example: that of eating meat. For the sake of argument I simply assume that 
there is a moral demand on people to eat less meat. It may also be argued that it is the slaughtering 
process (which often is quite cruel) that is morally wrong, yet for the sake of simplicity I assume that 
killing animals in itself is wrong. Most people seem to be aware of this moral objection to eating meat, 
yet do not consider the moral weight of this demand as sufficient to actually motivate them towards 
action. People often resort to arguments along the following lines; “whether I eat meat or not, my 
individual decision does not affect the number of animals killed by the meat industry. So I might as 
well.” Or, “humans have been eating meat for as long as they have been around, so why should I be 
morally required to change my eating patterns?” It are precisely such views and arguments that I think 
are expressions of coping mechanisms. Individuals may still think that it is a significant moral goal not 
to kill animals, but change their anticipation towards achieving this goal and their representation of 
the goal itself in order to cope with the complex and rather overwhelming reality that makes it hard 
 
 
12 
 
for most people to stop eating meat.    
  Such arguments obscure the moral discussion we should be having instead. The question at 
stake is not “does my individual consumption affect overall meat consumption?” or “why should I be 
the one who stops eating meat?” Instead, we should focus on the question “to what extent is it within 
my motivational and physical capacity to contribute to the stopping of killing animals for our meat 
consumption?” The answer to such a question is not as clear-cut as the answers one anticipates when 
considering questions that misrepresent the actual problem. One of the key reasons for this ambiguity 
is that each individual has different motivational abilities in confronting complex issues. Nevertheless, 
by shifting focus to the actual issue at hand, individuals become better able to recognize the full moral 
authority of moral demands, and thereby increase their own capacity to act upon their moral 
responsibilities in a world that is in fact much more complex than we often like to imagine. If everyone 
started feeling a sense of shame or frustration when eating meat, even if initially we do not undertake 
any actions that actually address the issue of eating meat, such a shared feeling of shame is likely to 
make it easier for most people to eat less meat in the future (or, for some, to stop eating meat at all). 
In a sense, the external reality one faces when confronted with the moral demand to stop eating meat 
changes, because for example people in your immediate surroundings at large accept negative feelings 
towards the eating of meat. It is by accepting lesser moral obligations at first, that we become able to 
address larger moral issues at a later stage.   
  Let me emphasize here again that acting upon moral demands is a cyclical process that is open 
to constant reevaluation of the significance of moral claims and individual capacity to act upon these 
claims. Together with the idea that morality is a matter of degrees, this implies that upon realizing a 
certain moral demand (e.g. the responsibility to stop eating meat), at first an individual her moral 
responsibility to fulfill this demand may be quite undemanding. Although to stop eating meat becomes 
an individual’s goal, confronted with a reality that is interfering with this goal, one’s initial capacity to 
pursue this goal may be rather low. Not only may there still be a strong affective desire to eat meat, 
but one’s social position in a society in which the eating of meat is normalized effectively decrease 
individual motivational ability to stop eating meat. Nevertheless, upon realizing the moral wrongness 
of eating meat, individuals have some responsibility to fulfil this moral demand. Accepting a feeling of 
shame, for example, whenever eating a piece of meat, could be sufficient to fulfil one’s initial moral 
responsibility. While it may not be fair to expect that, upon becoming aware of the moral 
blameworthiness, of eating meat somebody immediately stops eating meat altogether, it may be fair 
to expect that she accepts feelings of shame the next time she eats a piece of meat. The implication 
connected to this view is that, over time, such relatively minor demands (compare feeling ashamed to 
stop eating meat at all), I think will have greater effects in effectively addressing moral issues in the 
longer run. It is important to realize at this point, that there is no shame in feeling ashamed. Both 
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physical and mental incapability is something we see everywhere around us, yet it appears that we are 
much more reluctant to accept our mental incapabilities.   
  Instead of making idealistic claims about how people might be, the approach developed so far 
takes people as they are. I assume that individuals are aware of many moral principles. It is, however, 
because adhering to such moral principles is a difficult thing to do for most individuals from the 
standpoint of their individual practical reason, that we tend to conceal the full significance and 
authority of these demands. Individuals thus need to discover the full moral authority that moral 
demands carry with them. Claims that all free and rational individuals are simply able to directly act (in 
the narrow sense) upon moral demands are only counterproductive to such a goal, because a person 
confronted with such claims will only be more likely to resort to coping mechanisms when her current 
motivational ability is insufficient to undertake physical actions. Instead, by lowering the moral 
demands that are made upon a person failing to live up to moral demands, she will take this less 
demanding reality into account in a new cycle of her motivation process and become more likely to 
invest some effort towards fulfilling a moral demand. Such effort does not necessarily have to take the 
form of a physical action, but can also manifest itself in accepting feelings of shame, regretting the 
undertaking of an action, or simply by spending more time deliberating on the moral nature of the act 
or omission related to the moral demand. Such an act may in fact be the start of a process that will 
only make a person increasingly more motivated to contribute to the moral demand, and thereby 
render her more able to offset more stringent moral obligations.   
   At this point, many readers are likely to criticize the account of moral responsibility I have been 
developing as not being sufficiently demanding. How can we make sense of instances in which people 
with highly effective coping mechanisms undertake spiteful and cruel actions? Is it not unfair to hold 
them morally responsible to a lesser degree as compared to people who fail to comply to a less 
stringent moral demand, but whom are better aware of the moral nature of their actions? In order to 
defend the account of moral responsibility elaborated on in these first three sections against such 
objections, I will now focus on providing support for the claims I have been making by comparing them 
to other accounts of morality. First, It is helpful to designate my account as a theory of moral reason, 
and differentiate it from theories of moral standards. According to theories of moral reason, individuals 
are morally accountable for moral demands because they are aware of these demands, and not 
because it is desirable that they act in a specific manner.  
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2.4 Moral Demands 
In this section I will focus on the question when individuals can be regarded as morally accountable in 
specific. Becoming morally accountable implies that we become morally answerable for our acts and 
omissions. When morally accountable, the things we do or not do are open to moral blame. As I have 
claimed, the qualifier for becoming morally accountable is awareness. It is by becoming aware of the 
moral nature of your actions, that you become minimally accountable for moral demands. In basing 
my conception of moral accountability on the notion of awareness, I am referring to the mental state 
of becoming conscious of (1) a moral principle and (2) the corresponding morally relevant state of 
affairs. These two qualities were specified as the first two conditions of moral responsibility in the first 
section of this chapter. In order to make an assessment on the degree of moral obligation, it is 
necessary to make a judgement about an individual's capacity to act upon her awareness of a moral 
demand. To fully understand this, it is however first necessary to elaborate on why awareness 
functions as the first necessary and minimally sufficient marking point for moral accountability. Why 
is it that only when individuals are aware of the moral nature of their actions that they become morally 
accountable?  
  The discussion on moral accountability can be nicely situated within two different types of 
theories. Paul Hurley has referred to these different styles of theorizing as theories of moral standards 
on the one hand, and theories of moral reasons on the other (2011, 36–46). The key difference 
between these two theories is that the latter, theories of moral reasons, are based upon accounts of 
individual reason, whereas the former are not. Theories of moral standards propose a distinctive 
account of a moral demand, which then is presupposed to function as an evaluative mechanism for 
the moral nature of a person’s acts or omissions. Although this moral demand may refer to individual 
reason, and argue that individuals practically cannot deny the truth of this principle, theories of moral 
standards justify themselves in the purported objective truth of these principles, and not in the 
subjective perception and capability of individuals. In this section I will argue against theories of moral 
standards, and argue that moral accountability must exclusively be grounded in individual awareness. 
  To better grasp this difference between moral standards and a theory of moral reason, it is 
helpful to draw on Williams his account of internal and external reasons (1981). Williams argues that 
“basically, and by definition, any model for the internal interpretation [of reasons] must display a 
relativity of the reason statement to the agent’s subjective motivational set” (Williams 1981, 60). This 
is to say that we can only think someone has a reason to do something, if the agent herself recognizes 
this reason as something she is motivated to do within her standpoint of practical reason. External 
reasons, on the other hand, are reasons for undertaking an action which exist outside of the reference 
to any individual’s motivation for undertaking that action. For example, it does not seem absurd if 
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someone objects to Williams by saying  that there is an external reason I should send my mother 
flowers on her birthday, regardless of me having an internal reason for doing so or not. There seems 
to be an objective principle that loving and caring mothers should be spoiled and thought about on 
their birthdays, which explains why I have an external reason to send my mother a bouquet of roses, 
regardless of whether I actually feel motivated to do so or not.    
  Williams thinks, however, that there cannot be any such reasons for me to undertake an action 
without me being motivated to undertake that action. And if I have no apparent reason to undertake 
a certain action, it lies outside my capacity to undertake that action, and therefore I cannot be morally 
obligated to undertake that action. It may be helpful to quote Williams at large here:  
What Williams is saying here, is that an external reason (or moral standard) cannot explain a person’s 
action, if that person itself is not aware of  - does not belief, in his words, - such a reason. I am likely to 
think, for example, that it is true that all caring mothers should be send flowers on their birthday, and 
therefore that I am morally accountable for having forgotten to do so. However, the reason why I am 
morally accountable is that based on the recognition that there is a reason to send my mother flowers 
on her birthday I am at least minimally motivated to do so, by virtue of which it lies within my capacity 
to do so. However, since I assume that for individuals to be morally accountable, it must have been 
possible for them to have acted differently, my account differs from William’s in that I think people 
can only be motived to act upon a moral demand when they recognize (as in are aware of) the moral 
nature of that demand. Whereas I may be subconsciously motivated towards acting in opposition to a 
moral demand, as long as I am not aware of this demand, I am unable to change my course of actions, 
and therefore can also not be blamed for failing to do so.  I thus think that, in relation to moral demands, 
we need to add a further requirement on William’s account of internal reasons; namely that besides 
being motivated for doing X, in order for this action to be morally relevant, the motivation for doing X 
must stem from my awareness of a moral demand relevant to X’ing.   
  For example, if my brother would walk up to me and blame me for my forgetfulness in sending 
my mother some birthday flowers, he is implicitly assuming that I am aware of  an internal reason for 
doing so, and that therefore I should be blamed. Yet still, it is not the fact that I forgot my mother her 
birthday in itself which makes me morally accountable, but my awareness of the moral principle and 
the corresponding regrettable moral nature of my omission. Regardless of whether we conceive of 
awareness as purely cognitive, or as also influenced by affective subconscious reasons for action, what 
The whole point of external reason statements is that they can be true independently of the agent’s 
motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s (intentional) actions except something that 
motivates him to act. So something else is needed besides the truth of the external reason 
statement to explain action, some psychological link; and that psychological link would seem to be 
belief. A’s believing an external reason statement about himself may help to explain his action 
(Williams 1981, 63 emphasis added).  
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is at stake here is that there can only be morally relevant reasons to act when such reasons are 
recognized by an individual herself, thereby making an individual motivated towards such reasons. If 
this holds, only awareness of a moral demand renders it within an individual her capacity to act upon 
this demand and makes her morally accountable. In this sense, I thus regard awareness as a necessary 
condition for the assertibility of a moral claim.   
  Oppositely, philosophers advocating theories of moral standards are likely to object that the 
way individuals perceive things to be, from a moral perspective, cannot affect the nature of the moral 
demands to which they are accountable. Some utilitarian theorists, for example, think that there is a 
single objective state of affairs which is the optimal outcome from a moral point of view. Moral 
evaluation of a person’s acts and omissions, then, is based on their contribution to this optimal state 
of affairs. All actions that obstruct the preferred optimal state of affairs are regarded as morally 
blameworthy. Such theories have intuitive appeal because they emphasize the actions that individuals 
ought to undertake, regardless of whether they themselves are aware of such demands. There is thus 
always a moral demand upon all individuals to strive for achieving the moral optimal outcome. A often 
mentioned critique of such utilitarian theories, though, is that they are too demanding.   
  Peter Singer (also quoted in the introduction of this thesis) argues against to objection that  
utilitarian arguments are too demanding on individuals. Again, Singer argues that whenever “it is in 
our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else 
morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (1972, 836). Singer accepts that this moral demand 
would mean that every relatively well-off individual needs to drastically change their daily activities in 
order to live a morally praiseworthy life. He emphasizes that how things currently are should in no way 
affect how they actually should be. Liam Murphy, on the other hand, criticizes such a demand by 
arguing that it has no intuitive appeal. As he puts it “the demands it makes strike just everyone as 
absurd—as we say, a principle that makes such demands ‘just couldn’t be right” (Murphy 2003).  
  There seemingly are thus two conflicting intuitive appeals inherent to utilitarianism and  other 
theories of moral standards. On the one hand, it is appealing to think that there are certain things we 
ought to do regardless of our awareness of and motivation towards such a demand. Whereas, on the 
other, it seems rather absurd to expect individuals to account for every single act or omission that they 
may have done or not done in a morally better way. I think it is important to take away from Singer’s 
utilitarian defense of moral standards that the mere fact that a moral theory is demanding a drastic 
change in our everyday behavior, does not imply that it cannot be morally demanded that we ought 
to drastically change this behavior. My objection to Singer, however, is that such drastic changes can 
only be demanded if we are in fact aware of any reasons to do so. It may hence still be morally required 
that we drastically change our behavior, but individuals themselves only become accountable to such 
a moral demand when they themselves become aware of it. .  
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  Yet, the demand on constant  awareness of all moral demands and all corresponding morally 
relevant state of affairs is, I think, unable to be realistically consistent with human nature. Undoubtedly, 
there have been more than a few people, who, when confronted with the intuitive and logical force of 
Singer’s arguments, in fact felt sufficiently motivated to make his principle an important guideline in 
their everyday decision-making. It is hard to think that such people are not living a morally 
praiseworthy live. Yet, I am less content to argue that this also implies that those generally failing to 
take Singer’s principle into account, are necessarily living a morally blameworthy life.    
 The concept of moral blame itself means that the acts or omissions of individuals are regarded 
as blameworthy. My actions can only be blameworthy, however, if I am aware of the moral nature of 
those actions. Stephen Darwall (2006, 15) points this out by saying that “when we seek to hold people 
accountable, what matters is not whether doing so is desirable, either in a particular case or in general, 
but whether a person’s conduct is culpable (…). Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant 
the attitude and actions in which holding someone responsible consist in their own terms.” In order 
for a person to change her actions in a morally relevant way, the first requirement would be that she 
becomes aware of the moral nature of her acts and omissions. For example, the fact that I am morally 
accountable for alleviating the suffering of the poor and needy, as I will further focus on in the third 
chapter of this thesis, does not lie in the existence of this suffering itself, but rather in the fact that in 
some sense my acts and omissions can be blamed for failing to adequately address the existence of 
this suffering. Blaming me for this suffering is to say that you think I am aware of a reason to alleviate 
such suffering. If I would not have such a reason, it is unfair, morally speaking, to blame me for 
something of which I did not have any awareness that it was in fact blamable. It cannot logically be 
required from me that I have reason to bring about a better overall state of affairs, while at the same 
time I am not aware of such a reason, or of what this best outcome in fact is. Without fulfilling the two 
requirements of awareness I have no reason to change my acts and omissions in regards of a moral 
demand – and I cannot be blamed for not having such a reason.   
  But still, is it not plausible that someone objects that you should have been aware of the  
moral nature of a situation or of a moral principle? And that this in itself gives a reason for moral 
accountability. In the words of Wallace (1997, 324), “we think that agents who possess the powers of 
reflective self-control are morally accountable, because they are competent to grasp and comply with 
the justifications supporting moral demands.” Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to claim that in our 
current globalized information society we are aware of many more morally relevant states of affairs 
than we are actually accounting for.   
  Claiming that I should have been aware of the moral nature of the circumstances, however, is 
a claim saying that one thinks that I am sufficiently competent to be aware of this state of affairs, and 
that therefore I am morally accountable for failing to act. In other words, you think that I already am 
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aware of a moral principle or state of affairs, or am aware of an internal reason for becoming aware of 
a certain state of affairs or a moral principle; you think that I think that I should know or do something. 
On my part, however, this raises the requirement that I am in fact aware of such circumstances or 
principles, or that I am aware of a reason to become more aware of them, in the first place. Hence, it 
still follows from this objection that individuals become morally accountable only after they become 
aware of any reasons to comply to moral demands. We may still think that it is unfair to hold somebody 
with highly effective coping mechanisms morally accountable as compared to someone with a better 
understanding of the full significance of a moral demand. Yet, we can only feel this way because we 
think the other agent was in fact sufficiently competent to grasp a moral demand, and therefore should 
have acted in a specific way. Without this awareness, it would be unfair to blame even the most 
gruesome type of actions, however desirable we may think this is.    
  When trying to make sense of the relation between individuals with highly effective coping 
mechanisms performing, for example, certain cruel atrocities and their moral responsibility, there are 
on my account two ways through which we can make sense of the intuitive appeal that they should be 
hold responsible, despite their own apparent inability to feel shame or regret. The first, as I have done 
so far, is too  assume the Kantian claim that all individuals have a minimal capacity to recognize certain 
moral justifications in relation to some gruesome acts. When considering the killing of others, for 
example, we may assume that everyone can be blamed for undertaking such actions, since no matter 
how effective one’s coping mechanisms are, anyone can be expected to be sufficiently aware of a 
moral demand not to kill. A second more controversial approach, yet the one that I favor, is to say that 
some people cannot be held morally accountable even for the most gruesome atrocities, if they were 
not aware of any moral demands in relation to the performance of those acts. It is important at the 
outset of this claim to note that even if someone may not be morally responsible for undertaking 
certain act, they can still be held responsible from the perspective of justice. In section 3.1 I will further 
elaborate on the difference between justice and morality in relation to remedial responsibility in 
specific. Let me now further explain why I think that some people may not be held morally 
responsibility, even when it seems extremely desirable to do so.    
  The main reason why, is that, however bizarre a person’s behavior may seem, at the time of 
undertaking certain actions, those actions must have made sense to the person performing them given 
her own interests, beliefs, motivations, and situational position. Although it may be very hard to 
understand in hindsight, why someone acted in the way that she did, I think it is even more bizarre to 
think that someone acted in a way that she at the time of action is aware of is in fact an extremely 
atrocious action. This would be a type of irrational behavior that we usually attribute to people 
suffering from a psychosis, whose actions can also be regarded as not liable to moral blame. If 
somebody is completely unable to see why she should have acted otherwise, she cannot be blamed 
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for her actions, however desirable it may be. Let me emphasize again, however, that she can still be 
held accountable from a perspective of justice.  
  Strange as it may seem, I would briefly like to turn to safety research theory in order to 
illustrate why I think that this is. Sidney Dekker has described what he calls the ‘new view on error and 
performance’, which focuses on explaining “why people did what they did, rather than judging them 
for not doing what we now know they should have done” (2002, 372). Dekker argues that the tendency 
to attribute blame to agents prevents us from investigating what factors may have led to an agent 
acting in the way that she did. He argues:  
I think that the same tendency Dekker sees in assigning responsibility for failures in the workplace 
prevails in theories of moral standards when they try to assign moral responsibility to agents 
independent of their own awareness of that responsibility. Instead of assigning blame to an agent for 
performing the most evil acts, it would be more helpful to ask what made it possible for her to behave 
in this way in the first place. The answer to that question I am developing in this thesis it that coping 
mechanism can play a large part in obscuring the blameworthy nature of one’s acts and omissions. 
Therefore, we need to think about how we can counter those coping mechanisms, change the moral 
system in which they operate, and thereby prevent the further occurrence of regrettable or 
blameworthy acts and omissions. We cannot do this by blaming people because we think it is desirable 
to do so. Rather, as I will further elaborate on in the next section, we need to focus on what is within 
our own capacity to work towards a better moral system.   
   So far, I have focused on defending the claim that individual awareness is the first necessary 
condition for becoming morally accountable. Yet, this alone tells us little about the nature of this 
awareness in relation to moral responsibility. The fact that individuals are aware of internal reasons to 
comply with a moral principle and that it would therefore be fair to hold them morally accountable 
does not tell us whether they have most reason to comply with such a principle. It follows that 
awareness alone is not the only quality affecting my capacity to act upon moral demands.   
  This last point is important, because even within theories of moral reason there is the danger 
of sketching a too idealistic image of how individuals should behave, and thereby failing to take into 
account how persons actually can behave. There is still the need for a trade-off between how people 
are, and how they might be. By simply assuming that it follows from moral accountability that it is 
morally blameworthy for persons to fail to live up to moral demands, we may still be failing to take 
“The rationale is that human error is not an explanation for failure, but instead demands an 
explanation; and that effective countermeasures start not with individual human beings (…), but 
rather with the error-producing conditions present in their working environment. (…) When 
confronted by failure, it is easy to retreat into the old view: seeking out the “bad apples” and 
assuming that with them gone, the system will be safer than before” (Dekker 2002, 372).  
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into account a sufficiently realistic picture of how persons actually are. In section 2.1 and 2.2 it was 
argued that coping mechanisms may function to obscure the full significance of a moral demand, even 
if individuals have at times been aware of such a demand. Moral demands can thus be perceived as 
having less significance within the standpoint of practical reason as they would have if coping 
mechanisms did not play a role. Dependent on the level of authority that awareness of a moral demand 
carries within the standpoint of practical reason, individuals may have a greater or lesser motivational 
ability to act upon such demands. I will further defend this claim in the next section.   
 
2.5 Moral Authority  
In this section I will focus on the question of how we can make sense of moral obligations in relation 
to individual’s awareness of moral demands. The main discussion in relation to this question focuses 
on whether awareness of a moral principle and the morally relevant state of affairs alone provides 
sufficient authority within the standpoint of individual practical reason for allowing individuals to act 
upon these demands and circumstances. Or, in the words of Wallace, the question is whether an agent 
“has most reason to comply with moral demands, or whether such compliance is optimal from the 
standpoint of deliberative reason” (emphasis in original, 1997, 322). As I have already suggested, I do 
not think it necessarily is, and in this section I will further defend the claim that awareness alone is a 
necessary and minimally sufficient condition for moral accountability, but that the corresponding 
degree of moral obligations also correlates with the level of capacity that individuals have in acting 
upon moral demands.     
  The debate within theories of moral reason, as I see it, focuses on the extent to which the 
ability to grasp and comply with justifications for moral demands is hindered by affective mental 
processes, and to what extent this affects individual moral obligations. This discussion can, again, be 
divided among two styles of theorizing. On the one hand, there are Kantian theorists endorsing 
contractualist theories of moral reason, while on the other there are neo-Humean theorists arguing 
for more pluralist theories. Similarly to the debate between theories of moral standards and theories 
of moral reason, the debate among these two different theories of moral reason can also be situated 
in a desire to find the right balance between how people actually are and to what extent we can 
reasonably expect they might be.   
  On this scale of realism versus idealism, I think, if theories of moral standards take an idealistic 
position, Kantian contractualism takes an intermediate position. According to Kantians, it is recognized 
that people need to be aware of moral demands in order to be morally accountable, while at the same 
time maintaining that there are certain moral demands and self-evident truths of which it can 
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reasonably be expected that everyone is aware of them. Neo-Humean pluralists on the contrary, take 
a more realistic position, and emphasize that what people are aware of is historically and spatially 
contingent, largely dependent upon the context in which they are situated, and even determined by a 
person’s particular character and the mood she finds herself in. Therefore the pluralist position entails 
that different people can be aware of different moral standards depending on the influences they have 
been exposed to. I will situate my account of moral responsibility between these two different types 
of theorizing, because I assume that there are indeed certain moral demands of which it can be 
expected that all individuals recognize them, yet I also think that such recognition provides different 
individuals with different moral obligations depending on its relation to an individual's motivational 
ability for acting towards this goal.   
  In providing an account for Kantian contractualism, Stephen Darwall points out that “it makes 
no sense to blame someone for doing something and then add that he had, nonetheless, sufficient 
reason to do it, all things considered” (2006, 28). If we think that it would have been better for an 
individual to act in another way, while we also accept that it made sense from the practical rational 
standpoint of the individual to act in the way she did, it would be unfair if we would continue to blame 
the person for his acts and omissions. Darwall argues for a view of moral responsibility based on what 
he refers to as the ‘second-personal standpoint’. On this view, claims of moral demands are based in 
the mutual recognition of the authority of such claims. As was argued in the first section of this chapter, 
in order to make a moral demand upon another agent, it needs to be presupposed that the other agent 
is in fact both physically and cognitively able of addressing the demand at hand. In order to have such 
a capacity, Darwall thinks, it must, however, also be presupposed that the demand in fact carries 
sufficient ‘authoritative weight’ in order to motivate the agent towards such an action from the 
standpoint of her practical reason. In Darwall’s (2006, 34) words, “what makes a rational person 
subject to moral obligation must itself include a source of motivation to do as he is morally obligated. 
(…) The second-personal competence that makes us subject to moral obligation must include a source 
of the reasons in which moral obligation consists, along with the capacity to act on these reasons.” It 
is thus in the nature of moral demands itself that individuals also have the capacity to act upon them. 
Therefore, Darwall seems to think, once individuals have become aware of a moral demand, their acts 
and omissions automatically are equally blameworthy when they fail to act upon such moral demands, 
since such recognition implies that it reasonably lies within their capacity to act.     
  Even more, Darwall holds that all free and rational persons hold this competence to be 
motivated by moral demands and have the capacity to act upon this motivation. He builds on a view 
provided by Thomas Scanlon, who also argues that “thinking about right and wrong is, at the most 
basic level, thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately 
motivated, could not reasonably reject” (1998, 5). Darwall and Scanlon use the notion of reasonability 
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to support their Kantian view that all free and rational individuals are subject to moral obligations 
because by virtue of the recognizing that there are internal reasons for them to consider moral 
demands in their deliberations they are sufficiently motivated to act upon these reasons. If they fail to 
act upon the moral demands, they are morally blameworthy, since it can be reasonably expected by 
other persons that they would have been able to act upon the moral demands. It thus seems that they 
assume that there are some internal reasons which are recognized by all individuals, and that therefore 
all individuals are equally accountable to act upon these reasons.  
  Such views are opposed, on the other hand, by pluralist theorists who have a more 
particularistic conception of individual capacity to recognize and act upon moral demands. In his 
account of internal and external reasons Williams, for example, leaves open the possibility that even 
if an individual has become aware of a moral demand, she may still not fully understand the position 
of this demand within her subjective motivational set. A person may thus be aware of an internal 
reason for thinking that a moral demand has some authority, while not (yet) thinking that this moral 
demand also has most authority in directing her towards action from the motivational point of view. 
Such a view focuses on an agent’s particular ability to act upon moral justifications, and suggests that 
not all agents have a constant equal competence to be motivated toward moral demands. Hence, even 
if we assume that we all have a similar capacity to internally recognize moral demands as free and 
rational agents, the capacity to act upon these moral demands may be different for different persons 
and over different times.   
  To clarify this point it may be helpful to quote another insightful pluralist moral theorist, 
Samuel Scheffler, at length. He argues:   
 Scheffler here emphasizes that individual motivations may develop over time and are thus the result 
of a process of ongoing internal discovery. Compared to the view that certain internal reasons are 
available to all free and rational agents, this view suggests that the moral authority connected to moral 
demands can be different for different individuals. Even after an individual has become aware of a 
moral demand, one person may be more willing to act upon this demand than another.   
  Wallace himself thinks that, in the end, there is no significant difference between Kantian 
contractualist and neo-Humean pluralist accounts of moral responsibility. He argues, “even the Kantian 
will have to acknowledge, a phenomenon that we might refer to as inherent irrationality” (1997, 326). 
Despite the undeniable strength of self-interested motives, powerful motivations that are 
responsive to moral considerations can also emerge during the course of an individual’s 
development, motivations deeply rooted in the structure of the individual’s personality. Moreover, 
these motivations help shape the interests of those who possess them, and while their existence 
does not guarantee that conflicts between morality’s demands and the agent’s interests will never 
arise, neither do they always work to the long-term disadvantage of their possessors (Scheffler 
1992, 4).   
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By inherent rationality, Wallace refers to instances in which the “continued capacity to deliberate 
correctly is suspended.” Since it is obvious that there are circumstances or states of minds (e.g. as part 
of psychopathy) in which persons fail to grasp moral justifications, contractualists have to concede that  
it is the individual capacity to make a moral evaluation which makes an act or omission morally 
blameworthy. Wallace argues, however, that “we have not yet sunk to the point where it cannot 
generally be taken for granted that the people we interact with are competent to grasp the deliberative 
significance of moral justifications” (1997, 327). Those instances, Wallace thinks, in which neo-Humean 
pluralists argue that different people have a different ability to recognize the authority of a moral 
demand, are cases which Kantians would accept as belonging to the inherent rationality which 
inevitably is found among a relatively small number of individuals in each society. He thinks that since 
both theories accept that the capacity to reason morally is something which admits to degrees (for 
example between young children and adults), in practice there is no significant disagreement among 
pluralists and contractualists about the extent to which people can generally be held morally 
accountable.   
  I beg to differ, on the other hand, that even if there are no differences in persons' capacity to 
grasp moral justifications, there are important differences in the moral authority that these demands 
carry for each individual. I think Wallace fails to see that there is an important distinction between 
cognitive capacity and motivational ability, when he points out that in some instances a person’s 
capacity to deliberate rationally is suspended. I argue that it is more plausible to think that while all 
individuals have the capacity to recognize the justifications of moral demands, due to coping 
mechanisms their actual ability to act upon them may be decreased. Moral accountability does not 
necessarily, as Wallace sees it, have to function as an exhaustive constraint on the actions that an 
individual is allowed to undertake morally speaking without being blamed for them. If a certain moral 
demand carries a low level of authority within the standpoint of practical reason, individual 
motivational ability to take this demand into account in their actions and deliberations decreases. 
Therefore I think it is unfair to hold those who are less motivated to act upon moral demands 
accountable to the same extent as those who are more motivated to undertake morally praiseworthy 
actions. If one is less motivated to act upon a moral demand, the demand that is being made itself may 
lie outside the capacity of the individual. It follows from this that the individual cannot be fully blamed 
for such a lack of motivation.   
  Nevertheless, it is possible for a person's acts and omissions to not be subject to full moral 
blame, while also not being morally innocent either. Individuals are still morally obligated to undertake 
what does lie within their motivational ability. It is therefore important to make a trade-off between 
the moral demands that an individual is aware of, and the authority that these demands carry within 
her standpoint of individual practical reason. This trade-off manifests itself in different degrees of 
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moral culpability.  
  I derive this view on a scale of moral blameworthiness from insights provided by Larry May in 
his account of shared responsibility (1992). In providing this conception of shared responsibility May 
recognizes the need to expand “our vocabulary to account for the various gradations of fault of the 
disparate members of a community. In this sense, shame, regret, and taint are as important as guilt” 
(1992, 1). May suggests that individual characteristics, such as attitudes, are at least partially under 
the control of the individual. He “mixes element of choice and control”, to argue that even if one is not 
fully in control over one’s attitudes, it still makes sense to hold an individual morally accountable to 
some degree. Similarly, individuals who lack the capacity to act upon moral demands despite internal 
awareness of certain moral principles, must also be hold morally responsible to some extent for failing 
to live up to such demands when they are able to recognize them.   
  Even though someone is not sufficiently motivated to act upon a moral demand, by recognizing 
a reason that gives some authority to this moral demand, individuals themselves are aware that the 
action they are performing falls within the scope of moral accountability. Although they may not think 
that the moral demand has significant authority to guide their actions, since it carries some authority 
individuals are at least morally accountable to continue deliberating on the significance of this moral 
demand. The lowest degree of moral accountability thus manifests itself in the responsibility to 
counter one’s own coping mechanisms by not obscuring the significance of moral demands that one 
sees as too demanding to guide your actions. Instead, even if you are unable to change your acts and 
omissions, being aware of a moral demand renders you sufficiently able to continue performing the 
similar acts and omissions while, for example, maintaining feelings of regret or shame. As I have argued 
in this chapter, at some points in time maintaining such feelings are all that an individual is morally 
obligated to do in relation to the moral responsibility that she carries for her acts and omissions. While 
for other persons the moral obligation to feel regret may be too lenient, because they have a greater 
motivational ability to undertake actions towards a certain moral demand.  
   It has not been my aim to solve disputes among individuals who perceive different moral 
demands and corresponding obligations. The entire point of this thesis is to argue that we should 
accept such disputes, while focusing the discussion on explaining why we think that it is within our 
capacity to act or not act upon a moral demand. This does not mean, however, that we cannot still 
assume there are certain moral demands which all individuals are capable of recognizing, and of which 
no coping mechanism will ever obscure the full significance. However, in relation to remedial 
responsibility in specific, I think it is important to recognize that some individuals have a greater 
motivational ability to be motivated towards certain moral demands, than do others, and that such 
different abilities do come with different obligations.    
  This also does not mean, though, that with regards to less demanding moral principles, 
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individuals can choose to fully ignore the significance of certain moral demands, by referring to their 
motivational inability to actually doing so. The most lenient moral obligation to undertake certain acts 
or omissions while maintaining a sense of regret, is a type of action I believe all individuals are able to 
undertake once they are aware of the moral nature of their actions. It follows that, after becoming 
aware of a moral demand, a person cannot actively choose to become unaware of that moral demand, 
without failing to live up to the moral obligation to maintain a sense of regret or shame. Such a failure 
in itself would be regarded as morally blameworthy, in that a person ought to feel a sense of shame or 
regret for the act of actively choosing to ignore the recognized significance of a moral demand. At the 
moment of choosing to ignore, either a person has to actively undertake a morally regrettable action, 
or she has to decide that the moral demand was not something morally significant in the first place. 
This second decision may initially be the result of coping mechanisms obscuring the full significance of 
a moral demand. I think, however, that the moral obligation to maintain a sense of regret or shame is 
lenient enough for each individual to undertake with regards to a moral demand, even if its significance 
is greatly obscured by coping mechanisms. At least, realistically speaking, there is greater likelihood 
that the obligation to maintain a sense of regret does lie within an individual's initial capacity, while 
the capacity to undertake more demanding actions does not. In relation to remedial responsibility, for 
example, it is one thing to ask of people to invest their time or money in aiding the world’s poor, while 
it is another to ask of them to maintain a sense of regret or shame for not being able to do so.  
  By taking the natural tendency towards coping behavior into account then, I think it is possible 
to provide a theory of moral responsibility that sufficiently accounts for how people actually are, while 
also leaving ample room for individual moral culpability when people fail to live up to the moral 
demands that they are aware of. In the next chapter, I will use the insights gained in this chapter to 
argue for a moral conception of remedial responsibility. When discussing remedial responsibility, 
theorists have generally relied on notions of justice in order to obligate people to offset their 
responsibility for remedying suffering on both global and national scales. I will argue that in case of 
remedial responsibility, notions of justice are inadequate to provide an account of responsibility since 
they rely too much on notions of causality and interdependence. Instead, I think that a moral 
conception of remedial responsibility, based on notions of capacity and awareness, is much better 
capable of explaining why particular agents carry remedial responsibility. Let me now turn to this point.   
 
3.1 Remedial Responsibility: Justice & Morality   
In arguing for a moral conception of remedial responsibility based on the twin pillars of awareness and 
capacity, I would like to start by differentiating moral obligations from obligations of justice. To draw 
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this distinction, it is first important to specify what I mean by remedial responsibility. This specific type 
of responsibility, as I see it, is the positive obligation that agents have for providing goods and services 
to other people by virtue of them deserving or being entitled to those goods and services. In this thesis 
I do not want to consider what it actually means for an agent to deserve or be entitled to something, 
or when they can make a claim on the positive duties of others. It is simply assumed that many people 
currently living under very depriving circumstances should be helped through the provision of extra 
aid. Onora O’Neill specifies a key characteristic of the duty to supply such goods and services when she 
mentions that “we can know who violates a liberty right without any allocation of obligations, but we 
cannot tell who violates a right to goods or services unless obligations have been allocated” (2005, 
428). According to such a view, we must first allocate obligations to specific agents before we can make 
sense of the positive duty to assume remedial responsibility. Yet, when considering these obligations, 
there are two more types of principles which can help guide there allocation: principles of justice and 
moral principles.   
  As further pointed out by O’Neill (2005, 430), an important difference between these two 
types of principles is that when regarding principles of justice, there can be no obligations without 
claimants, whereas when regarding morality, there can be obligations even if there are no specific 
claimants defined. O’Neill argues that from the perspective of justice, we cannot make sense of 
universal human rights, if such rights do not provide corresponding obligations to agents for providing 
them to those who have been deprived of their rights. That is to say from the perspective of justice we 
cannot at the same time hold that human rights have normative value, while they do not simultaneous 
invoke specified counterpart obligations. For to say that others have a right to goods and services, 
according to principles of justice is to specify exactly who is responsible for supplying them, otherwise 
the rights to such goods and services is itself meaningless. From the perspective of morality, on the 
other hand, we can say that individuals have a moral obligation to account for moral principles, simply 
by the nature of moral demands themselves – without anyone having to make a claim on them. In the 
case of morality, the nature of obligations is not located in a claim, but by virtue of other qualities that 
can function as evaluative mechanisms for appraising individual acts and omissions. To say that I am 
morally responsible is not to say that somebody first needs to make a claim on me having to behave 
morally, but rather I become morally responsible for my conduct by virtue of an appraisal of my 
conduct itself.    
  Such a moral appraisal as I see it must account for the three conditions specified in section 2.1 
of this thesis, focusing on individual awareness and capacity as basis for evaluating a person her 
conduct. I think that we can derive from such a moral appraisal of a person her conduct, as opposed 
to assessment based on a principle of justice, that while justice is something which we can force upon 
one another, morality is not. Moral evaluation of someone else’s conduct is based on my own 
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perception of the moral nature of my acts and omissions. By definition, however, awareness is 
something which is inevitably mine, and which cannot be forced upon me, without me actually 
recognizing the same moral principle as somebody else may do. In the legal realm one is regarded 
innocent until proven otherwise, but when indeed proven guilty, the justice system will force 
individuals to be hold accountable regardless of whether they agree or not. When considering morality, 
on the contrary, accountability can only be invoked by individuals themselves. Even if somebody can 
blame me for my acts or omissions, as long as I am (1) unaware of the moral demand that her claim is 
based upon, (2) unaware of the morally relevant state of affairs affected by my acts or omissions, or 
(3) think that I could not have reasonably be expected to have acted otherwise, all the blame in the 
world would still not make me feel blameworthy. One can try to explain to me why I am morally 
accountable, but without myself recognizing the validity of this claim, I cannot be held morally 
responsible - even though according to principles of justice I may be found guilty.   
  Yet then, how can moral responsibility function as an adequate principle in guiding our conduct 
towards alleviating the world’s plight?  
  According to David Miller it cannot. In his account of remedial responsibility Miller (2001, 455–
64) makes the distinction between casual responsibility and moral responsibility as principles of 
remedial responsibility, where I think his notion of causal responsibility can be seen as a principle of 
justice. Whereas causal responsibility focuses on the causal role that an agent has in bringing about 
the outcome of state of affairs, moral responsibility “involves an appraisal of the agent’s conduct.” 
Such an appraisal, according to Miller, “requires us to ask questions such as whether the agent 
intended the outcome, whether he foresaw it, whether his behavior violated some standard of 
reasonable care, and so forth.” In these aspects, Miller thinks that moral responsibility is a narrower 
notion than causal responsibility, since there will be many instances in which an agent’s conduct 
cannot be blamed morally speaking, while there is some sort of link between his acts and omissions 
and the harmful consequences they have on the faraway and needy. Yet, Miller also acknowledges 
that in some other sense moral responsibility may be a wider notion than outcome responsibility, for 
it can render agents blameworthy for some state of affairs, even when there is no direct and clear 
relation between their acts and omissions and the existence of a harmful state.    
  Miler here seems to agree that, especially when considering the world’s plights, moral 
responsibility is a much more suitable notion in assigning responsibility than casual responsibility. First, 
he argues that in cases of human right deprivations, for example, there are often no identifiable agents 
who have clearly caused this state of affairs. Secondly, causal connection in global networks involve 
many diverse agents which have all contributed to the outcome in some sense, but among whom it is 
near to impossible to designate to what extent each particular individual contributed. And at last, 
causation alone is not necessarily sufficient in assigning responsibility, because it is possible for agents 
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to cause negative outcomes through their actions, without those actions themselves being 
blameworthy – for example where poverty results from fair and equal competition in a market system.  
  Yet, Miller goes on to argue that moral responsibility is also not an adequate principle for 
assigning remedial responsibility: “the biggest problem with the moral responsibility principle (…) – 
one that it shares with the causal principle – is that it looks too exclusively to the past in assigning 
remedial responsibility” (2001, 460). According to Miller, moral responsibility is not so much concerned 
with asking who is best capable of remedying a state of affairs per se, but more with how this capacity 
relates to agents their acts and omissions and how they brought about a harmful state of affairs. This 
is where I divert from Miller’s reading of moral responsibility, because I employ a different 
understanding of capacity than he does – one that I think is inherent to moral responsibility.   
  The key difference is, I think, that Miller seems to use a more consequentialist utilitarian 
reading of capacity, whereas I have argued for a notion of capacity that situates itself in the standpoint 
of individual reason. What matters on this second reading is not how effective on is in remedying a 
depriving state of affairs, or how much costs an individual agent needs to bear, but rather how an 
individual herself perceives these qualities in relation to her capacity. On this reading, if a person 
perceives her own ability to remedy a poor state of affairs as effective or relatively undemanding, she 
has a greater capacity to in fact do so, and therefore failing to do so should incur a greater level of 
moral blame, compared to when she would perceive that she only has a very minimal ability to do so. 
   Even more, on Miller’s reading of capacity, he argues the concept neither adequately accounts 
for the historical conditions which explain why agents have certain capacities in the first place, nor can 
capacity as a principle account for the relations between specific agents and how this is related to their 
mutual responsibility. On such an interpretation I think Miller fails to see that capacity is not merely a 
physical quality, but also cognitive one. In this sense, the fact that my own physical capacity has been 
generated by, say for example, historical injustices can affect my motivational ability to help those at 
the other, less fortunate, end of the spectrum. If I think that my ability to give aid to those less well-
off is the consequence of historical injustices, while I also recognize some moral demand of 
(intergenerational) fairness, I also perceive the moral nature of my acts and omissions as more 
significant in relation to those who have suffered from those injustices. Besides, my motivational ability 
for taking responsibility for the consequences of my acts and omissions are also higher when I perceive 
the agents who are affected as having a special relationship to me. Such a relation is, however, not 
necessarily provided by cultural similarities, but rather by how I perceive this relation to be. It is 
granted that many people will think it more significant to help their kin and compatriots, and thereby 
have a greater capacity to do so, yet still this is not all there is to say about it. It is also not unlikely that 
I perceive that I have a much closer relationship to some people living across the globe, thereby 
rendering me - motivationally speaking - more capable to take their positions into account while 
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performing my acts and omissions as compared to when considering my compatriots.   
  In the next section I wish to expand on these claims about the nature of moral remedial 
responsibility, and argue that moral responsibility is in fact an adequate principle for filling the gap that 
has been left open by the allocation of obligations in accordance with principles of justice in relation 
to individual remedial responsibility.   
3.2 Moral Remedial Responsibility 
The main issue with moral principles guiding our remedial responsibility seems to be that if we cannot 
force morality upon one another, there are no obligations to actually address harmful situations. On 
the awareness and capacity account I proposed, the question remains: how to make sense of moral 
remedial responsibility when people may be actively trying to avert their awareness away from moral 
demands, harmful conditions, and (to the extent that it is consciously possible) decrease their 
motivation to act upon such demands and conditions.   
  One response is to say that moral remedial responsibility simply is inadequate in addressing 
remedial responsibility, and that it purely is a matter of justice to allocate positive duties for providing 
goods and services to those living under harmful conditions. Although I do agree that there is an 
important role for justice to play here, as should be clear by now, this is not the type of response I am 
offering within this thesis. In the previous chapter I made clear that individuals are morally responsible 
to the extent that they are aware of moral demands, the morally relevant state of affairs, and it lies 
within their capacity to act upon this awareness. Despite my argument that there are obligations for 
different types of acts depending on the motivational ability that an individual has to act upon such 
awareness, I argued that all individuals at least have a minimal obligation to actively try and remain 
aware of moral demands, even if they may not be required to actively act upon them. By lowering the 
moral obligations at such initial points of awareness, I argued that individual capacity to work towards 
moral demands over time becomes greater.  
  At the basis of this minimal obligation in relation to remedial responsibility lies a conception 
of moral universalism which is close to the idea of “internal essentialism” Martha Nussbaum has 
developed. I believe that “the deepest examination of human history and human cognition from within 
still reveals a more or less determinate account of the human being” (Nussbaum 1992, 207 emphasis 
in original). This idea is what Nussbaum refers to as, first, “empirical essentialism,” and thereafter as 
“internal essentialism.” This account is based on a notion of common human functioning. Although I 
will not go into specifics on what characteristics Nussbaum attributes to this notion, I wish to point out 
that I share her idea that one characteristic of what makes humans human is that they have a capacity 
for affiliation with other human beings (Nussbaum 1992, 219). If people fail to show even the most 
minimal degree of affiliation and concern for others, they commonly cannot be regarded as humans. 
 
 
30 
 
(I would prefer the term ‘person’ instead of ‘human’ here, but I will stick to the terms Nussbaum is 
using.) Besides, based on this capacity for affiliation, I also agree with Nussbaum that a human pursuing 
the good life, will be able “to live for and with others, to recognize and show concern for other human 
beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction” (Nussbaum 1992, 222). Although 
each person may in fact have a different conception of the threshold after which the amount of 
concern one shows represent the good life, it is important to recognize that we all do see the generic 
notion of concern for others as a good thing. There is at the most basic level the essentialist conviction 
“that the other is one of us”, and it is based upon the recognition of this minimal compassion to others 
that we are at least minimally aware of the moral demand to take others into account with regards to 
our acts and omissions. Appraisal of my acts and omissions on this view should be done by virtue of 
the effects that they have on those with whom I share a common humanity.   
  However, evaluating moral responsibility by virtue of a common humanity does not at face-
value account for the qualities of awareness and capacity that I have put so much weight on in the 
second chapter of this thesis. For one, Iris Marion Young seems to provide a possible account on how 
we can make sense of moral responsibility to those faraway and living under severe circumstances in 
relation to awareness of common relations and our capacity to act upon them. Through distinguishing 
between a liability model and a social connection model for allocating responsibility, Young also argues 
against the standard focus on principles of justice in assigning responsibility  (Young 2006, 115–25).  
On the liability model, she points out, responsibility is allocated by assigning agents with guilt for a 
depriving state of affairs. Such a model, however, “relies on a fairly direct interaction between the 
wrongdoer and the wronged party” (Young 2006, 118). Similarly to the Miller’s notion of causal 
responsibility, due to the complexity of many harmful states of affairs such a model is inadequate for 
distributing remedial responsibility in relation to the world’s plight. Young argues, that “while it is 
usually inappropriate to blame those agents who are connected to but removed from harm, it is also 
inappropriate (…) to allow them (us) to say that they (we) have nothing to do with it” (Young, 2006, 
118 emphasis in original). Based upon this reasoning, she argues for a social connection model for 
assigning responsibility. Such a model is much tighter related to the notion of capacity I have been 
arguing for than is Miller’s.   
  In the social connection model, responsibility is assigned by referring to agents “carrying out 
in a morally appropriate way and aiming for certain outcomes” (Young 2006, 119). What is important 
on this account is the social role that a specific agent has, and the corresponding actions that we can 
morally expect her to undertake by virtue of this position. For example, as part of my position as a 
consumer in a global market society, it is not possible to blame me for injustice in this market society 
on the basis of me having caused them. Yet, since by virtue of my role as a consumer I am related to 
those affected by the existence of the system I am maintaining (Young pays special attention to 
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workers in sweatshop), I am still responsible for undertaking morally appropriate actions. Young thinks 
such actions should primarily come in the form of political actions, through which we take 
responsibility together for depriving conditions. She also emphasizes that not all agents within this 
system have an equal responsibility to take such action. Depending on an agent her power, privileges, 
interests, and collective ability the capacity of some agents is greater than others, thereby also giving 
them a greater responsibility to tackle injustices (Young 2006, 126–30).   
  In contrast to Miller, Young here thus thinks of capacity more in the sense of actual individual 
ability, where greater ability leads to greater responsibility, to some extent regardless of how this 
relates to other agents' ability. What is most important is not that the extent to which people are 
responsible for remedying poor situations is fair compared to the share of others based upon their 
relative contribution to the problem. Though Young thinks that this is one aspect which should play a 
role in assigning responsibility, since we cannot make a clear judgement of the extent to which each 
agent has contributed to depriving conditions, she thinks it is better to put most emphasize on 
individual ability by virtue of an agent her social role.    
  Although I think it is important for assigning remedial responsibility that we focus on an agent's 
capacity, I disagree with the emphasis that Young puts on the actual interdependence between agents. 
She differs from Miller in emphasizing a more forward-looking principle of capacity in assigning 
responsibility, but I think that by relating this principle to the social position of agents she also shares 
with Miller the focus on physical ability, while remaining to neglect motivational ability. In order to 
make a better assessment of the moral obligations of agents, as I have argued, I think it is also 
important to give weight to what agents perceive their ability to be, regardless of what is actually 
within their physical capacity.   
  This idea on an individual’s capacity and its relation to moral responsibility is tightly connected 
to a more recent argument proposed by David Zoller. He argues that “[a person who is aware of a 
moral demand but fails to fulfill corresponding obligations] does not fail to imagine that there are 
moral stakes, consequences, and victims in unstructured collective action; however, her contributory 
actions suggest she fails to imagine that these stakes are real and that victims are real persons whose 
autonomy can exercise claims on her freedom. This sort of failure (…) is a class of moral harm in itself” 
(2015, 997). Zoller here acknowledges that what is important for an agent to be morally blameworthy 
is that she recognizes a connection between her acts and omissions and the corresponding state of 
affairs. Anyone who does recognize such a connection, but fails to account for it in her actions, 
according to Zoller is indeed a moral wrongdoer. Zoller here also defends himself against the objection 
that it can be argued that individuals always should be aware of certain consequences of their actions. 
He argues that “what I “ought to have recognized” for purposes of moral responsibility must be 
sensitive to the information I have at the time I act. If the agent could not reasonably have seen her 
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action as a cause of a given harm – granting that she already does not jointly intend the outcome – 
then she could not have been reasonably expected to see that harm as hinging on her action” (2015, 
1000–1001). In other words, in order for agents to be morally responsible they need to be aware of 
the moral nature of the acts and omissions that they are performing. Upon becoming knowledgeable 
agents, persons recognize moral principles that let them to perceive other agents as moral equals. 
Failing to take this equal status of the perceived others into account, according to Zoller, then is morally 
blameworthy.   
  Despite my agreement with the account of morality that Zoller has developed, in the positive 
account sketched in the second chapter of this thesis I made it clear that awareness alone is a necessary 
but not automatically a sufficient condition to render agents morally responsible to the full extent. I 
would like to add to the view that Zoller is proposing in relation to remedial responsibility, that besides 
awareness of a connection between my acts and omissions and their relation to other agents, my 
capacity to act upon this awareness is also influencing the degree to which I am morally responsible. 
Granting that awareness alone may be sufficient to make me morally accountable in a minimal sense, 
my capacity to actually act upon the awareness of the moral nature of my acts and omissions can make 
me more or less accountable. If coping mechanisms obscure the moral nature of my actions by 
decreasing the perceived significance of a moral principle, my motivational ability to act upon such a 
principle also decreases (even if I remain aware of the principle). It follows from this, as I argue, that 
at that point in time agents are also morally accountable to a lesser degree, than if the moral nature 
of their acts and omissions had not been obscured. In this sense it is not necessarily morally 
blameworthy to the full extent if I fail to perceive the equal status of other human beings. Although it 
may be within my capacity to perceive all human beings as equal, due to coping mechanisms my 
current ability may obscure the full significance of this equal status making feel more comfortable 
going about my daily life, neglecting the lives of other faraway human beings. This is also not to say 
that people may not genuinely hold that they have greater obligations to those closer to then than to 
others far away. Yet, upon becoming aware of others they can never – morally speaking - fully neglect 
the others, and should consider their awareness of all other humans in their deliberations, acts and 
omissions.    
  Still, even though one may accept this argument for awareness and capacity as a guiding 
conditions for a moral principle of remedial responsibility, one may still be very skeptical about the 
extent to which these conditions can make people morally responsible for offsetting their moral 
obligations. Thomas Pogge, for example, differentiates between positive duties and negative duties, 
and argues that:  
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  This is exactly the kind of argument that I set out to tackle with this thesis in the first place, 
since I think it misplaces the question we should be focusing on. Pogge here takes for granted the 
realistic idea that individuals are rather reluctant to provide aid to the far away and needy. He goes on 
to take this empirical idea on human reluctance as a reason for shifting towards principles of justice as 
the main virtue by which remedial obligations should be allocated. However, I think that this focus on 
principles of justice which we see in Pogge’s theory and in other forms in the theories of other 
philosophers as well, is sensitive to his own argument that people are aversive to providing aid to those 
who need it. I think that the rather negligible progress made over the past several decades in improving 
the lives of the badly-off, or a glimpse at current levels of global inequality, should be able to raise 
questions on how effective principles of justice in fact are in allocating (and more importantly, 
offsetting) obligations for remedial responsibility.   
  Instead, on the account developed in this thesis, I think more can be done to fill this gap in 
remedial responsibility by making people aware of a moral demand to do so, while at the same time 
focusing on the capacity that they actually have to fulfill this moral demand. By opening this discussion, 
we are moving to the questions which I think are most important. In asking of people to what extent 
it is within their capacity to help, we move away from universalized obligations that apply equally to 
all individuals. Instead, people are morally accountable for remedial responsibility to the extent that it 
is within their motivational ability to offset this responsibility. Even if this capacity is initially very low, 
by posing the moral obligation that they remain aware of the moral demand and the moral nature of 
their acts and omissions, it has been argued that their motivational ability to act will increase over time, 
and thereby thus also a person’s actual ability to do so. In a world where we stop obscuring the full 
significance of moral demands person by person, it will only be a matter of time before what was 
initially perceived as idealistic, will become sufficiently realistic.   
 
4. Conclusion 
I started this thesis by quoting Secretary-General António Guterres’ statement that there is no excuse 
for inaction or indifference in aiding the world’s hungry. Some may think that while my argument has 
followed this line of thinking in arguing against indifference, at the same time I have in fact offered an 
The positive formulation is easier to substantiate. It need be shown only that [people] are very 
badly off, that we are very much better off and that we could relieve some of their suffering without 
becoming badly-off ourselves. But this ease comes at a price: some who accept the positive 
formulation think of the moral reasons it provides as a weak and discretionary, and thus do not feel 
obligated to promote worthy causes, especially costly ones. Many feel entitled, at least, to support 
good causes of their choice – their church or alma mater, cancer research or the environment – 
rather than putting themselves out for total strangers half a world away, with whom they share no 
bond of community or culture (Pogge 2001, 60).   
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excuse for inaction: coping. The way in which people perceive things to be, may result in them having 
less stringent moral obligations. Yet, although I see coping behavior as a reality with which we have to 
live, and one that we need to take into account when thinking about our moral obligations, I all but 
see it as a definite excuse for inaction. In this thesis I hope to have offered a starting point for thinking 
about the relation between coping and moral responsibility. My overall aim has been to start a new 
discussion on what lies within human motivational ability, and how we can make sense of related moral 
obligations. With this aim in mind, I hope to have offered an account that  is sufficiently realistic, while 
also remaining satisfactorily idealistic.   
  I started by offering three conditions that I think are essential for guiding our thinking about 
moral responsibility in relation to coping behavior: roughly speaking, individuals must (1) be aware of 
a moral demand, (2) be aware of the morally relevant state of affairs, and (3) must to some degree 
have the physical and motivational ability to act upon this awareness. While I regard the first two 
conditions as static provisions, the third condition is one that comes in degrees. Awareness is seen as 
a necessary and minimally sufficient requirement for being morally accountable, while the degree of 
moral responsibility is positively correlated to the degree of a person her motivational and physical 
capacity. With regards to motivational ability in specific, I have argued that if one has a greater 
motivation to act towards a moral demand, this also comes with greater obligations to do so. Even if 
all persons may have an equal capacity for recognizing moral demands, they at times may not have an 
equal ability to act upon these demands. For people to increase this ability, it is important that the 
initial moral demands posed upon them are not outside of their motivational ability at that time, and 
therefore cannot be too stringent.   
  In order to defend why I think that moral obligations must take motivational ability into 
account, I have situated this account of morality as a theory of moral reason. First, I have drawn on 
and extended William’s account of internal reasons to argue that it does not make sense to think a 
person has a moral reason to do something, if she herself does not recognize and is not motivated 
towards this reason. Such an argument may be criticized by what are known as theories of moral 
standards, according to which there are external reasons that people should take into account 
regardless of their awareness of such reasons. To counter this objection, I followed Darwall in saying 
that in order to think of an act or omission as blameworthy, a person must think that her acts are in 
fact culpable – she must be aware of the moral nature of her actions. Even if one may hold that certain 
actions are morally desirable, in itself this desirability does not provide another person with a reason 
for action, unless she herself is aware of this desirability. Yet, in this thesis I have assumed that all 
individuals have an equal capacity for becoming aware of the desirability of moral demands. At face-
value, this assumption would provide all persons with internal reasons for undertaking certain morally 
important actions. Nevertheless, I have also defended the view that even if we do not assume that all 
 
 
35 
 
individuals have an equal capacity for recognizing moral justifications, my account of moral 
responsibility still holds – providing we accept the implication that some acts and omissions may fall 
outside the scope of morality (while remaining within the scope of justice).   
  What is important, though, is that the cognitive capacity to recognize moral demands needs 
to be distinguished from the physical and motivational ability to act upon them. To better understand 
this differentiation I related my account to both Kantian and neo-Humean accounts of moral 
responsibility. Upon becoming aware of a moral demand, which Kantians hold that all rational 
individuals can do, this demand carries varying amounts of authoritative weight within the standpoint 
of practical reason of different individuals. Dependent on the amount of authoritative weight it carries, 
according to neo-Humean accounts, one has a greater or lesser capacity to act upon this demand. I 
combined these two accounts by distinguishing between the individual capacity to recognize moral 
justifications and the capacity to act upon them. I argued that, if a moral demand carries less 
authoritative weight, the potential for action is smaller, whereas if it carries more, the potential for 
action is greater. Only if the motivational ability of individuals is increased (if the authoritative weight 
of the moral demand is increased), does our capacity to act upon these moral demands increase, and 
so do the moral obligations that we have for doing so. Depending on the motivational ability that 
different people have at different points in time in relation to a moral demand, I argued that some are 
morally obligated to maintain feelings of shame or regret, while others could in fact be morally 
obligated to undertake certain concrete actions. I also responded to the possible objection that due to 
coping mechanisms this would mean that people can choose not to accept the full significance of a 
moral demand, by arguing that the obligation to maintain a sense of shame or regret is likely to be in 
most people their initial motivational ability. Therefore, morally speaking, we generally cannot actively 
obscure the moral obligation to take the full significance of a moral demand into account when 
conducting certain morally relevant actions.    
  In chapter three, I linked this general account on moral responsibility to remedial responsibility 
in specific. I argued that principles of justice, although important, by themselves are inadequate in 
providing an account on why we should help the world’s badly-off. This gap in obligations of remedial 
responsibility, I think can be filled by providing a moral account of remedial responsibility. One that 
does not focus on the allocation of obligations by virtue of their relation to a certain outcome, but 
rather on the obligations that people have by virtue of their moral conduct based on the two pillars of 
awareness and capacity. I specifically argued against Miller’s backward-looking conception of capacity. 
An individual’s motivational ability to perform acts does not fully correlate to the outcome of her acts 
and omissions; instead, the focal point is what she perceives to be the outcome, and what she 
perceives may be different from what she does. From a moral perspective, if I perceive that the 
outcome of my actions have great effects for aiding the world’s poor at a very low cost, while I also 
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have the motivational ability to undertake these actions, I am morally required to undertake them, 
regardless of how this capacity arose. One’s motivational ability is, however, often influenced by 
current circumstances and past phenomena, as well as by coping mechanisms responding to 
demanding obligations, and thereby does affect the moral obligations that a person has.   
  Yet, I have agreed with Martha Nussbaum’s ideas on common humanity that people have a 
common capacity for a minimal level of compassion towards “others”, which functions as a basis for 
an account of moral universalism. Although we perceive to have special relationships towards our kin 
and compatriots, for instance, and this influences our motivational ability and corresponding moral 
obligations, by virtue of our common humanity we can never fully neglect the significance of taking all 
others into account when considering moral demands. It has been argued that what is important for 
our moral obligations, is not that we are through some system of interdependence connected to others, 
or that our actions are affecting others, but that we are aware of the moral nature of our acts and 
omissions in relation to others. There is a minimal moral obligation to take all other people into account 
with regard to moral demands by virtue of our common humanity. When we are aware that there is a 
moral demand requiring us to act differently by virtue of this common humanity, this brings with it the 
minimal moral obligation to feel regret or shame if we fail to do so.   
  I hope that my argument for this universal minimal obligation of feelings of shame and regret 
in relation to our failure to remedy the circumstances under which the world’s badly-off live, we can 
work towards a slow but gradual change in our perception of our capacity to provide aid. Although for 
some people, a feeling of shame may be too lenient for them to fully offset their moral responsibility, 
I think that this minimal moral obligation that we all share can function as an adequate starting point 
for thinking about what we actually should do to help the faraway and needy. Instead of (partly 
subconsciously) hiding ourselves behind the idea that providing aid is such an unrealistic and over 
demanding obligation, let us instead focus on why exactly we think that it is so demanding. Even if we 
conclude, then, that for whatever reason it is in fact physically or cognitively too demanding to provide 
aid, there is I think no reason for us not to accept a feeling of regret that we are unable to do so once 
we recognize that there is a moral demand on doing so. By itself, such a collective acceptance of regret 
may open new doors on what we think we are capable of doing, thereby contributing to remedying 
the world’s plights in the longer-run.    
  More generally speaking, I hope that with this thesis I have provided a new way for thinking 
about moral responsibility; one that is both consistent with human nature, while also providing a basis 
for thinking about what we ought to do. I have tried to think of moral demands from a more bottom-
up approach, by which morality is grounded in individual awareness and capacity. This approach does 
not provide us with stable ground for differentiating between different moral principles, but rather 
asks us to ground morality in relative subjectivity. Such an approach I think, to many people, may seem 
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as unstable – and therefore morally unfit. Yet, I think that it is exactly this instability which will make it 
possible for more people to behave in a morally more appropriate manner. By requiring people to 
think about the moral demands that they recognize, and what moral obligations they have for fulfilling 
these demands, the thinking about morality is moved to the brink of realism and idealism. It is, I think 
and hope, precisely at this edge, that we can gain most in not only thinking about our behavior, but 
eventually also changing our behavior.  
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